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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a heterogeneous traffic network with multiple users classes which differ
considerably in their path selection objective. In particular, we consider two classes of users: ones who
seek to minimize social cost (socialists) and the ones with typical greedy objective (anarchists) which
leads to a heterogeneous game termed as HetGame. The paper proposes an analytical framework to
derive optimal/equilibrium flow in such a heterogeneous game along with a method for the same. The
paper considers multiple examples of different networks to derive the optimal traffic assignment. We
introduce two metrics: price of α anarchy and price of good behavior to evaluate the impact of anarchists
and implications of central directives. Finally, the proposed algorithm is implemented for a real traffic
network to derive insights.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traffic congestion is an important problem for planning of any urban city, owing to increasing
traffic every day. Congestion games are an important framework for studying real-life traffic
patterns, both from the road-network perspective and communication network perspective. Owing
to a large number of possible routes to reach their destination, it may be difficult for the users to
choose the optimal path. Moreover, current traffic systems are complex and heterogeneous. One
interesting source of heterogeneity is real-time traffic information. For example, consider a simple
network in which some users follow route recommendations from an in-vehicle navigation system
while others follow their own understanding. Such a scenario results in a so-called HetGame,
a congestion game among heterogeneous users with different path selection objective. The
dynamics and equilibria of HetGames can provide insights in network planning and centralized
user routing.
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2Related Work: Optimality of a path itself depends on the user’s perspective. Most literature
on optimal traffic assignment is divided into two main directions owing to the following two
objectives: (1) The individual perspective to decide a route by choosing the least costly available
path or (2) the socialist behavior to chose paths which minimizes the average cost of everyone.
The first strategy may lead to an equilibrium which is the Nash equilibrium (NE) of corresponding
congestion game and can be formed as an optimization problem using Wardrop’s equilibrium
conditions [1]. However, this strategy is not optimal from the perspective of the city government
or the city planner (e.g. department of transportation, or city government) [2]. The city planner
would want the second strategy so that the total travel cost in the city to be minimized, which is
popularly also known as the social optimal situation. Along with analytical studies, past literature
has proposed many algorithms and numerical methods to solve the problem in an iterative manner.
The problem of traffic assignment can be written as a general convex optimization which can be
solved with standard optimization techniques. One promising technique is to use the Frank-Wolfe
Algorithm to determine the optimal flows [2]. Along with networks with homogeneous users,
there has been some work in studying network with some heterogeneity of users. For example,
in [3], a traffic network with users with varying trade-off preference between minimizing the
latency it experiences and minimizing the money it is required to pay was studied. Scenarios
where a user fraction can cooperate (known as Stackelberg equilibrium) was studied in [4]. In [5],
a traffic network where random users are coexistent along with the regular traffic was analyzed
to derive the optimal flow. In [6], it was shown that tolls can be used to derive incentives to
make nash equilibrium and social optimum the same. Prior literature studies congestion games
in which users have different utility function parameters [7], [8]. These parameters can model
varying sensitivity to money, risk, fuel consumption. [9] proposed deterministic strategies for
central planner in order to provide desired flows, including by randomly routing players after
giving them specific guarantees about their costs. Along with networks with social and selfish
objectives, there can be networks where both such users co-exist. Some of the users are ready
to obey central directives and some of them are purely selfish. All the mentioned work have
not studied networks having users of such heterogeneous nature which is the main focus of the
work.
Contributions: In this paper, we consider a heterogeneous traffic network with multiple users
classes which differ considerably in their path selection objective. In particular, we consider two
classes of users: ones who seek to minimize social cost (socialists) and the ones with typical
3greedy objective (anarchists). This work examines non-atomic congestion games with these two
user classes. We develop a framework to derive optimal/equilibrium flow in such a heterogeneous
game and propose an algorithm for the same. We also propose two metrics: price of α anarchy
and price of good behavior to evaluate the impact of anarchists and implications of central
directives. We consider multiple networks to derive the optimal traffic assignment. With the help
of analysis, we derive insights about these systems to help formulate central directives which can
make the social optimal solution to be equal to the equilibrium. We also evaluate the proposed
algorithm for a real traffic network.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider a traffic network with heterogeneous users (commuters/packets)
termed as heterogeneous traffic network (HetTN). The traffic network N is modelled as a graph
G with nodes V and edges E. There are K source destination pairs {pk : (ak, bk), k = 1 : K}
with the required flow dk between the source and destination of kth pair. A path Pk between a
source destination pair k consists of a set of connected edges i.e.
Pk = {e1, e2, · · · en} : such that e1 = (ak, s1), e2 = (s2, s3),
· · · en = (sn, bk), si ∈ V ∀i ∈ [1, n].
Let Pk = {Pk} denote the set of all path between the kth pair. Let P = ∪k=1:KPk. Let the flow
in each path P ∈ P be denoted by fP . For any edge (link) e ∈ E, the total traffc flow in the link
is equal to the total flow in that link as contributed from all paths of all the pairs fe =
∑
P3e
fP .
Each link e ∈ E has a general latency function le(·) such that the cost incurred in that link is
equal to
ce = le(fe).
This latency function depends on the ink characteristics, for example, type of the link, its capacity,
construction materials. We assume the traffic network is heterogeneous so that the required flow
dk can consists of different proportion of different types of users, as defined in the following
subsection.
A. User Classes and General HetGame
We assume that there are M types of users where different types differ in their proportion
of the total population and traffic path selection strategy. Let M denote all types of users. We
4assume that a type m ∈ M has proportion αm of the total demand flow for each kth pair pk.
The complete traffic assignment problem can be seen as a M player game termed as HetGames
where the set of m type users can be seen as a single player m. Let the combined strategy of
this player m is Xm = (XmP )P∈P . Given the strategy, the flow of type m users in a path P is
given as αmXmP . The utility function of the mth player is denoted as um(Xm, X!mα), where
X = {Xm : m ∈ M} is the combined strategy and X!m = {Xj : j ∈ M, j 6= m}. Thus, the
total flow in any link e for the heterogeneous traffic network is
fe =
∑
P3e
∑
m∈M
αmXm,P .
To clarify the type of users, we describe some of the interesting users types in the following
list:
1) Socialist: Socialist users aim to minimize the total cost of the network which is given as
C(Xs) = −
∑
e∈E
fele(fe).
In a traffic assignment problem with socialists users only, the optimal flow is given as the
argmax of C [10]. Therefore, we can say that the utility function of the socialist player is
average cost of the network which is given as us = −
∑
e fele(fe) [10].
2) Anarchist: Anarchist users aim to minimize their own cost, and therefore chose the path
with the least link cost. For anarchist flow, the optimal flow is given as the nash equilibrium
of the traffic assignment problem. In the absence of any other class of users, the optimal
flow for anarchist is given as the solution of the following problem [1]
Xopta = argmin
∑
e∈P :XaP>0
∫ fe
0
le(v)dv (1)
Therefore anarchist player utility can be given as
ua = −
∑
e∈P :XaP>0
le(fe).
3) Proportionally-Fair Socialist: The proportionally-fair strategy tries to minimize the total
cost function while maintaining fairness—conceptually, fairness requires that not even a
small fraction of users experience a particularly high cost. These users minimize the cost
uf = −
∑
e fe exp (le(fe)).
5B. α-Anarchy HetGame
In the current paper, we will consider a particular HetGame with two classes of users: socialists
with αs = (1 − α) proportion and anarchists with αa = α proportion. We term this game as
α-anarchy HetGame. For each source and destination pair pk, the required anarchist flow is αdk
and socialist flow is (1− α)dk.
Let Xs = x be the socialist strategy and Xa = y be the anarchist strategy. For any pair pk,
the sum of the socialist flows in all the paths is
∑
Pk∈Pk
(1− α)xPk , which is required to be equal
to the total demand (1− α)dk. This results in the following flow constraint:
Ss :
∑
Pk∈Pk
(1− α)xPk = (1− α)dk, ∀k
for socialists. This constraint is equivalent to
Ss :
∑
Pk∈Pk
xPk = dk, ∀k
Similarly, for the anarchist, the flow constraint is given as
Sa :
∑
Pk∈Pk
yPk = dk.
Now, in any edge e, the total flow is equal to
fe =
∑
P3e,P∈P
(1− α)xP + αyP . (2)
In the game where both classes co-exist, each class will try to optimize their own flow in
presence of the flow of other class according to their own path selection strategy as described
above. In the next section, we will develop a framework to derive the joint optimal flow for the
users of the two classes.
III. JOINT OPTIMAL FLOW
The α-anarchy HetGame consists of simultaneous play between two types of users trying to
minimize a different cost function. From a high level, the anarchists will try to achieve nash
equilibrium (NE) given the socialist flow and the socialists must find a socialist flow so that the
responding NE strategy from the anarchists achieves the minimum social cost. In this section,
we focus on developing a framework to derive the optimal flow. The following Theorem is
particularly helpful in solving this two stage problem.
6Theorem 1. Given socialist strategy x in any general α-anarchy HetGame, the NE of anarchist
users is given as the solution of:
y∗ = argmin
y
∑
e
∫ ye
0
le(
∑
P3e
(1− α)xP + αz)dz
such that ye =
∑
P3e
yP ,
∑
Pk∈Pk
yPk = dk.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Now, the socialist users (or the player) must choose a strategy x∗ such that the total cost of the
network C =
∑
e fele(fe) is minimized. Therefore the optimal strategy is given as the solution
(x∗, y∗) of the optimization problem S which is simultaneous solution of the two following
sub-problems S1,S2:
S1 : x∗ =argmin
x
∑
e
fele(fe)
such that fe =
∑
P3e
(1− α)xP + αy∗P (x),
∑
Pk
xPk = dk
S2 : y∗(x) = argmin
y
∑
e
l′e (ye, x)
such that ye =
∑
P3e
yP ,
∑
Pk
yPk = dk.
where l′e(ye, x) is the modified link cost function for anarchist and given as
l′e(ye, x) =
∫ ye
0
le
(∑
P3e
(1− α)xP + αz
)
dz. (3)
The link cost function le(·) is generally taken as convex (e.g., of the form le(xe) = be +
ae(xe/ce)
d, d ≥ 1). The above optimization is a convex problem for convex link cost functions
and can be solved using the following alternative minimization 1 S1 given y∗ and S2 given x∗:
IV. ANALYSIS FOR NETWORKS WITH LINEAR LATENCIES
In this section, we will analyze some special cases and derive optimal flow for these special
cases. To compare the equilibrium/optimum performances, we define the following two terms
which help in characterizing impact of a strategy.
Price of α-anarchy: Price of α anarchy is defined as relative increase in the average cost due
to presence of α proportion of anarchists i.e.
PA =
Total cost with α anarchists and (1− α) socialists
Total cost of system with no anarchist
7Algorithm 1 Alternating Minimization:
Initialize to x∗0, y
∗
0 , i = 0.
Solve optimization S1 to compute x∗1, y∗0 .
Solve optimization S2 to compute x∗1, y∗1 .
while Change in solution is greater than tolerance do
At step i,
x∗i+1, y
∗
i = S1(x∗i , y∗i )
x∗i+1, y
∗
i+1 = S2(x∗i+1, y∗i )
i→ i+ 1.
end while
Price of good behavior PG: Second important metric to understand the social implications of
social strategy is price of good behavior which indicates the penalty a person may pay being a
follower of the central directive. It is defined as the relative cost of following central directive
compared to that when being selfish i.e.
PG =
Average cost of a socialist user
Average cost of an anarchist user
.
A. Network with Linear Latencies
Let us consider a traffic network with linear link cost functions i.e. le(xe) = aexe + be. Here
be is the free flow time and ae is congestion dependency parameter and both depend on link
type. For example, freeways have high be and low ae while city streets have higher ae and small
be. For this case, the modified link cost function are given as
l′e(ye, x) =
∫ ye
0
(
ae
(∑
P3e
(1− α)xP + αz
)
+ be
)
dz
=
aeα
2
y2e +
(
be − ae(1− α)
∑
P3e
xP
)
ye.
8A B
𝑙1 𝑓1 = 𝑎1𝑓1 + 𝑏1
𝑙2 𝑓2 = 𝑎2𝑓2 + 𝑏2
Fig. 1: A illustration showing the two node two link network. The required demand flow is 1 between node
A and B
So, the optimization problem S1 can be written as the following convex optimization problem:
x∗ =argmin
x
∑
e
aef
2
e + befe
such that fe =
∑
P3e
(1− α)xP + αy∗P (x),
∑
Pk
xPk = dk, ∀k
where y∗(x) is given by
y∗(x) = argmin
y
∑
e
aeα
2
y2e +
(
be − ae(1− α)
∑
P3e
xP
)
ye
such that ye =
∑
P3e
yP ,
∑
Pk
yPk = dk.
B. General Two-link Linear Network
As a special case of previous subsection, we will consider a general two node two link network
(See Fig 1) with linear latency. There are two possible paths in the network and unit demand
flow between the two nodes. The link i(i = 1, 2) has latency aifi+bi where fi is the flow in that
link. Without loss of generality, let us assume that b1 > b2. It can be observed easily that, in the
absence of socialists (i.e. α = 1), the equilibrium flow is given by NE [1] as f1 = 1−A, f2 = A
where A =
b1 − b2 + a1
(a1 + a2)
. We will assume that 0 ≤ A ≤ 1. Also, in the absence of the anarchist
traffic (i.e. α = 0), the social optimal solution is given as f1 = 1 − f2opt, f2 = f2opt where
f2opt =
a1 + (b1 − b2)/2
a1 + a2
.
9Now for general α−anarchy HetGame, let the anarchist strategy be (y1, y2) and the socialist
strategy be (x1, x2). Using Theorem 1, we can compute the NE of the anarchist users as solution
of S2 given x2 as
y2(x2) =

1 if R1 : x2 ≤ A1−α − α1−α
A
α
− 1−α
α
x2 if R2 : A1−α ≥ x2 ≥ A1−α − α1−α
0 if R3 : x2 ≥ A1−α
(4)
where A =
b1 − b2 + a1
(a1 + a2)
. The above solution indicates that socialist can in fact indirectly force
anarchist to chose an arbitrary strategy via a well designed socialist flow.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
x2
y 2
NE strategy y2 versus socialist strategy x2
 
 
α=0
α=0.2
α=0.45
α=0.75
α=1
Fig. 2: The NE strategy flow y2 in the second path versus socialist strategy flow x2 of the second path for
different values of α in the considered two-node-two-link linear network with a1 = 0.3, b1 = 1, a2 = 0.7, b2 =
0.8. Socialists can in fact indirectly force anarchist to chose an arbitrary strategy via a well designed socialist
flow. However, control can be limited for particular values of α, such as α < A and α > 1−A.
For better understanding, we will take a particular instance of the above mentioned network
with the following parameters: a1 = 0.3, b1 = 1, a2 = 0.7, b2 = 0.8. In this case, the anarchist
equilibrium is (1− A = 0.5, A = 0.5) and optimal social flow is (0.6, f2opt = .4). Fig 2 shows
the optimal NE for three regions. For α = 0.2, y2 shifts from the value 1 in R1 = (0, 0.375) to
the value 0 in R3 = (0.625, 1). This indicates that by diverting 20% socialist traffic to the second
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path, all anarchists can be forced to take the second path, while by diverting 70% socialists to
the second path, all anarchists can be forced to take the first path. It is possible that not all of the
above regions exist for particular values of α which can restrict the fraction of anarchists which
can be forced or affected by the central planner. For example, for α = 0.75, only A/α = 66.67%
anarchists at max can be forced to take the second path. It can be shown that R1 doesn’t exist
for α < A and R2 doesn’t exist for α > 1−A. Also note that as α increases, the impact of x2
on y2 decreases as evident from the slope in region R2.
Now, given the NE strategy y = (y1, y2), the socialists (or a central planner such as city
government) will design the flow for socialist such that total cost C is minimized over all the
three regions.
1. Region R1: the optimal solution in this region is x2opt = (f2opt−α)/(1−α). Since f2opt < A,
x2opt < (A− α)/(1− α) i.e. contained in R1.
2. Region R2: the total flow in second path f2 is always equal to A and total cost is the same
for all values of x2. Hence no minima exists in this region.
3. Region R3: the optimal solution in this region is x2opt = (f2opt)/(1− α). Since f2opt < A,
x2opt < (A)/(1− α) i.e. it falls outside the region R3. Hence no minima exists in this region.
Now, based on the above discussion, we can now state the following result.
Theorem 2. For the above-mentioned two link network with α anarchy, the following statements
hold
1) When α ≤ f2opt, the optimal strategy for socialist and anarchist is
(x1, x2) =
(
1− f2opt
1− α ,
f2opt − α
1− α
)
(y1, y2) = (0, 1).
In this case, the total flow in two paths is the social optimum flow as the socialist are able
to compensate for the anarchist flow and bring the system to the social optimum.
2) When f2opt < α ≤ A, the optimal strategy for socialist and anarchist is
(x1, x2) = (1, 0)
(y1, y2) = (0, 1).
In this case, the socialist cannot compensate for the anarchist traffic. All anarchists take the
second link and all socialists take the first link. The total flow in the network is (f1, f2) =
(1− α, α).
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3) When α > A, all strategies are optimum. The total flow is constant at A and the two links
offer the same cost of travel.
Fig. 3 shows the cost versus x2 for different values of α. It can be observed that as α increase,
the optimum value of x2 decreases from f2opt until it reaches 0 at α = f2opt.
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Total cost with anarchist NE strategy  versus socialist strategy x2
 
 
α=0
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α=0.45
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Fig. 3: Total cost of the network with NE strategy y∗(x2) versus socialist strategy x2 for different value of
anarchy α in a general two link HetGame with a1 = 0.3, a2 = 0.7, b1 = 1, b2 = 0.8. The cost is minimized in
region R1.
Fig. 4 shows the equilibrium flow in the network for different values of α. Fig. 5 shows the
variation of price of anarchy and good behavior with α. It shows that increasing anarchy will
hurt anarchists also as evident from the increase in the price of anarchy. It can be seen that with
increasing fraction of anarchist, price of being a good citizen increases, but after a threshold, it
starts decreasing and eventually becomes equal to 1 where all users start seeing the NE cost in
both paths.
Corollary 1. Consider a simple two link network with a1 = 0, b1 = 1, a2 = 1 and b2 = 0. In
this case, link cost functions are l1(x) = 1 and l2(x) = x. For this case, price of anarchy and
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Fig. 4: Equilibrium flow in a linear two link HetGame with a1 = 0.3, a2 = 0.7, b1 = 1, b2 = 0.8. Up to
anarchy limited to f2opt, the central planner is able to keep social equilibrium. After this, flow in second path
increases until system reaches the pure anarchy (Nash equilibrium) state.
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Fig. 5: Price of α anarchy and price of good behavior with varying α for a linear two link HetGame with
a1 = 0.3, b1 = 1, a2 = 0.7, b2 = 0.8.
good behavior are given as
PA =
1 if α ≤ 1/24
3
(1− α + α2) if α > 1/2
PG =

3−2α
2(1−α) if α ≤ 1/2
1
α
if α > 1/2
.
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V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
To explore behavior of the HetGames laid out in previous sections, we studied a model of
a real-world transportation network. One publicly-available dataset is a 24-node model of the
road network in Sioux Falls, SD. The model characterizes the latency on 76 links connecting
24 nodes and provides trip data in the form of 528 origin-destination pairs. Each latency is a
polynomial of form le(xe) = d
(
1 + b(xe
c
)a
)
. As a network grows, it is infeasible to enumerate
the set of all paths Pk connecting a given source-destination pair. Therefore, we have selected
Pk to be the four shortest zero-user paths using Dijkstra’s algorithm.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1
1.005
1.01
1.015
1.02
1.025
1.03
1.035
Anarchy fraction (α)
Pr
ic
es
 
 
PA for α=1
PA
PG
Fig. 6: HetGame equilibrium for Sioux Falls network showing the price of α-anarchy and Price of good
behavior. Increase in the price of anarchy and decrease in the price of good behavior with increasing fraction
of anarchists may motivate more people to be socialists and follower of central directives.
The proposed Algorithm-1 is used to compute the HetGame equilibrium flows. In each itera-
tion, the anarchist flow is computed holding the socialist flow constant; similarly, the socialist flow
is computed holding the anarchist flow constant. If the updated flows do not differ significantly
from those in the previous iteration, the algorithm may terminate. Fig. 6 shows the price of
α-anarchy and price of good behavior of the HetGame equilibrium for various α values.
Traditional definition of price of anarchy (with α = 1) is also shown in the figure. It can be
seen that price of good behavior decreases with increasing fraction of anarchist. It also shows
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that increasing anarchy will hurt anarchists also. Both of the above observation can lead to
motivating more people to be follower of central directives.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we derived a framework for general traffic network with heterogeneous users,
including an α-anarchy HetGame and studied it both analytically and via numerical simulation on
road network models. We discussed how social flow can be used to affect the flow of anarchists
in desired direction. The work has many possible extensions. For example, HetGame with more
number of user classes (e.g., proportionally fair, random, and fixed path-followers) can be studied.
It is also interesting to analyze these systems in the presence of random noise. We can also
consider the case where the socialists in the HetGame could modify their objective to be minimize
of average socialist cost, neglecting the anarchist portion of the full social cost. Such strategy
has potential to reduce the price of good behavior providing incentive to people who wish to
adhere to central directives.
APPENDIX A
PROOF FOR THEOREM 1
Proof. Given the socialist strategy x, the anarchist will decide their flow by computing the NE
for their flow αy. Given x, the latency they face in any edge e is given by Le(
∑
P3e αyP ) where
L(w) = le(
∑
P3e (1− α)xP + αw) for any strategy y. Let us assume y′e =
∑
P3e αyP . With
these new latency function, the NE of the flow following anarchist strategy will be equal to
Wardrop equilibrium [1] which is given as the solution of the following problem
min
y
∑
e
∫ y′e
0
Le(w)dw
such that y′e =
∑
P3e
αyP ,
∑
Pk
yPk = dk
which is equivalent to
min
∑
e
∫ y′e
0
le(
∑
P3e
(1− α)xP + w)dw
such that y′e =
∑
P3e
αyP ,
∑
Pk
yPk = dk
which will give the desired result with substitution y′e = αye and z = αw.
15
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